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Introduction
The plume environment in which Space Station Freedom (SSF) will operate is very important for
structural analysis because loads induced by the Orbiter jet firings on SSF can cause severe damage to the
SSF structure. All jet firings that could be encountered during an approach to SSF need to be analyzed to
test the dynamic structural integriD_ of the SSF, particularly the solar arrays (SAs). As a result, the jet
firings from a +vbar breakout sequence need to be modeled to calculate the various forces and torques on
the SSF structure. The current Orbiter breakout burn is damaging to the SAs so there exists the desire to
decrease the breakout burn magnitude while maintaining necessary safeD' clearances. Also, in an attempt
to decrease SA loading, breakout modes are divided into two classes during an approach to SSF. The
transition point between these two classes has been determined as a function of the SA placement. For
this analysis, the transition point is defined as 75 ft from Interface to Interface (ITI) between the Orbiter
and SSF. For berthing approaches, ITI means the distance between the Remote Manipulator System
(RMS) end effector and the SSF grapple fixture. For docking approaches. ITI is defined as the distance
between the Orbiter docking plane and the SSF docking plane. If the ITI range is outside of or at the
transition point, the first burn of the breakout sequence is a radial down (-X Rectilinear Shuttle Body
Coordinate System (RSBY), or +Z Local Vertical/Local Horizontal Coordinate System (LVLH)) firing.
Inside the transition point, the first burn of the breakout is a Norm-Z. or +Z RSBY, firing.
In addition to the "position along the approach" distinction of the breakout, this study addresses the two
philosophies of breakout, which are Non-Time-Critical (NTC) breakout to return on a future day and
Time-Critical (TC) breakout which requires the Orbiter to deorbit within 30 minutes of the emergency
declaration. The bulk of this study deals with the NTC breakout and its firing histories while the TC
breakout is not analyzed in detail since it is extremely unlikely to occur and since, most likely, it could not
be protected for an.xavay, due to a large Orbital Maneuvering System firing essentially at the back of SSF.
As a result, the TC breakout is only covered in a cursory manner. This stud)' protects for immediate
collision with SSF as well as long-term safe trajectory issues. Some criteria chosen for this stud)' are from
the "Acceptable Clearance Criteria for Payloads Ejected from the Orbiter Cargo Bay" memo by DA2/T.
Holloway, dated October 9, 1990.1 Although this memo deals with acceptable clearance for payloads
ejected from the bay, the criteria are applied here because the breakout scenario includes structure
approaching the Orbiter cabin. The acceptable "worst case" clearance is therefore chosen to be five feet,
as stated in the memo. The worst case scenario covers many errors and is detailed later. An earlier study
was performed to determine the initial firings for Preliminary Design Review for use in loads analysis. 4
This study will update to the Conceptual Design Review (CDR) data base and complete the breakout
sequences. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to determine the bounding breakout firings required to
place the Orbiter on a safe trajectoD when performed between +vbar intercept and mating under worst
case conditions. Once the firing histories are developed, they will be provided to the loads communit) to
analyze the loading on the SSF SAs and associated structure for CDR.
Assumptions and Constraints
The following assumptions and constraints were used for this study.
1. SSF and the Orbiter can hold ± 1 deg deadbands throughout the entire breakout.
.411 analyses on approaches to SSF hca,e been constrained by this rule. Failure to pepform to this
capability holds the potential _f structural damage _hw to plume loading on S.4s that are not in an
optimal position.
2. A redundant laser sensor is available to the pilot.
This eliminates the need to protectJbr range rate error inside of lOO fi that would need to be
protected for if the closed-circuit television overlays were being used.
3. No plume-induced vehicle dynamics are modeled in the simulation.
4. Vernier attitude control is used in this study.
The I'ernierjets induce a -Z RSBY rate, or closing rate, during a +vbar approach. While this is not
bad for the plume Ioad_ on the SAs, the attitude firings can cause a decrease in the opening rate and,
therefore, the I "ernierjets are worst case for clearance analysis.
5. The Orbiter maintains maximum area "into the wind" throughout breakout sequence and propagation.
This increases drag and therefore is consistent with worst case for the long-term clearance analysis,
since higher drag on the Orbiter will tend to bring it back towards" SSF from behind.
6. Impulse input is at a rate of approximately one pulse per second.
7his allows for verification of the correct input and placement of a delay m the breakout maneuver.
7. The RMS can be moved out of the way quickly enough that the RMS is not a clearance issue during a
breakout from a berthing approach.
This reduces the envelope of clearance protection that needs to be maintained throughout the
trajecto_. .
8. The SAs for gravity gradient structure attitudes (Stage Configuration 5 (SC5)) are aligned with the Y
LVLH axis. For horizontal attitudes (Permanently Manned CapabiliW (PMC)), the arrays are
assumed to have certain constraints for the feathering positions. Alpha is to be between zero deg and
-90 deg, and Beta has no restrictions and is placed in the worst case for clearance position for each
run.
9. The altitude chosen for this study is 220 nautical miles (nmi). The study analyzes the tail-down
+vbar approach currently baselined for MB3 through PMC. Digital Autopilot (DAP) A will be used
throughout analysis.
10. The assumption is made that the Orbiter Reaction Control System (RCS)jet firings do not damage
the SSF solar arrays when the Orbiter is outside ofa 1000-ft radius sphere centered at SSF.
This assumption is based on the structural loading communi_,'s" belief that there should be no intpact
to firing RCSjets outside of a lO00-fi radius sphere centered at the 5;SF mating interface.
Operational Concerns and Goals
The following concerns and goals were used when defining this study.
1. Develop a generic breakout procedure for all flights to SSF.
2. Maintain flexibility for attitude control during the breakout procedure.
Since the crew will want to maintain visual contact _f possible, it is desirable not to place restrictions
on the attitude _f the Orbiter during the breakout. For the analysis, the Orbiter will be kept in a "tail
to the Earth" attitude throughout the entire trajectom..'. Also, the attitude firings that are likely during
a breakout will help with initial clearance and thus were not included to maintain worst case.
3. Refrain from imposing restrictions on the mode in which the translational firings are input.
4.
This requires that the pilot be able to perform the breakout burn in either Pulse (Discrete) mode or
Accel (Norm) mode. Pulse mode allows for a more precise burn input but it requires longer w
complete all of the necessar3, inputs. Accel mode inputs the burn quicker but is less accurate m
obtaining a desired burn magnitude. Flight data and simulation data show that the pilots can hit
their targets in Accel mode to within ± 0.2jps. ThereJore, this study will determine the minmmm
burn required with analysis done in Pulse mode and then incorporate the needed pad to account for
bruiting in .-tccel mode.
In addition to the 5-fi safety margin for the initial clearance, the guideline was set to have at least a 2-
nmi buffer (fig. 1) between the Orbiter and SSF when the Orbiter is behind SSF on its separation
trajector3 _.
This allows fi_r time and distance Jbr cleaning up the trajectory chtring real-time operations.
X
Coordinate System
Z [" > 2 nmi
Figure 1. Example of Long-Term Safety Buffer.
Models
Two SSF structure configurations were chosen as the models for this study: SC5 (fig. 2) and PMC (fig.
3). SC5 was chosen because its structure extends farthest along the LVLH -Z axis. and therefore
represents the worst case structural clearance for the Norm-Z velocity burns which result in the Orbiter
going over the SSF structure. PMC was chosen because it has the full structure on orbit and has the SAs
on the port side. SC5 is assumed to have the SAs aligned with the LVLH Y axis and therefore presents no
Y constraints on the breakout if there is sufficient clearance in the X-Z LVLH plane. PMC is a different
matter. The SA position can influence clearance greatly if the Orbiter ha,: an initial state dispersed in the
-Y direction. As a result of this influence, protection during the breakout ts provided for Alpha angles
between zero deg and -90 deg Beta angles are constrained and are positioned for the worst case structural
clearance condition. The geometric characteristics for these structures were provided by B. Benkowski
with McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company at Huntington Beach. The models have been updated
through 7/23/91.
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Figures 2-3. SC5 and PMC.
Both SC5 and PMC approaches are docking scenarios. The structural differences between SC4 and SC5
are very small with the exception of the berthing adapter and the docking mechanism, so the only concern
with interchanging the two configurations is the clearance issue. When an ITI range is established, the
cabin of the Orbiter is closer to the SSF structure on a docking run than it is on a berthing run, even
though the ITI range is identical (fig. 4 and fig. 5). Also, the RMS can be moved, which allows even
more clearance than in the docking case: therefore the docking to SC5 is a more extreme case than a
berthing to SC4. The analysis will develop breakout maneuvers to provide a safe trajectory for a docking
approach to SC5 and these maneuvers will, by default, protect for the extreme berthing case.
3
2
133.7
89.4
75.0
Figure 4. Berthing to SC4.
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Figure 5. Docking to SC5.
The major points of concern on these models are the outmost structural pieces, the docking interface (DI):
the target locations and the center of gravity (cg) locations. The mass properties for the SC5 structure are
from the Integrated Operations Scenarios dated February 1992. and the mass properties for PMC are from
Lockheed data dated 4/30/91.
TABLE I. SC5 AND PMC MASS PROPERTIES.
SC5 Structure
Weight = 161724 lbs
Inertias in slugs*ft*fl
Ixx = 1.40E7 Ix3'=-9.38E7
13y = 1.42E6 Iyz = 9.66E5
Izz = 1.34E7 Ixz = 2.37E5
Drag Area = 10451.2 FT^2
for Cd = 2.0
PMC Structure
Weight = 470907 lbs
lnertias in slugs*fl*fl
Ixx = 6.92E7 Ix3"=-2.38E6
153"= 9.12E6 Ivz = 1.45E6
lzz = 7.31E7 Ixz = 1.31E6
Drag Area = 20119.25 FT^2
for Cd = 2.0
i
The docking interface locations relative to the cgs of each configuration are determined from the
geometric diagrams of the two structures.
TABLE II. SC5 AND PMC RELATIVE DOCKING INTERFACE LOCATIONS.
SC5 Structure
LVLH
(cg to DI)
X = 22.17 fi
Y =-12.33 fi
Z=59.18fi
PMC Structure
LVLH
(cg to DI)
X = 42.49 fi
Y = -23.23 fi
Z = 7.70 fi
The Orbiter modeled for this study has the following mass properties:
TABLE III. ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES.
Orbiter Modeled
(Shuttle Structural Coordinate Svstem)
Weisht(lbs) cs(inches)
247165.98 X = 1095.30
Y = 0000.03
Z = 0377.45
Ixx= 887302 sl*ft*fi Iyz = 971 sl*fi*fl
I)_'= 6386877 sl*fl*fl Izx = 247376 sl*fl*fi
Izz = 6694367 sl*fl*ft Ix_'= -5632 sl*fi*fl
The DAP settings for the Orbiter are set to the following values:
TABLE IV. ORBITER DAP CONFIGURATION.
ITEM
TRANS Pulse MAG
PRI ROT Pulse MAG
VER ROT Pulse MAG
PRI AUTO MNVR Rate
VER AUTO MNVR Rate
PRI ATT Deadband
VER ATT Deadband
PRI Rate Deadband
VER Rate Deadband
DAPLOAD Settings
DAP A
0.05 ft/s
0.20 deg/s
0.02 deg/s
0.20 deg/s
0.02 deg/s
1.00 deg
1.00 deg
0.07 deg/s
0.02 de_/s
DAP B
0.01 ft/s
1.00 deg/s
0.1 deg/s
1.0 deg/s
0.1 deg/s
1.00 deg
1.00 deg
0.07 deg/s
0.02 deg/s
Breakout Regions
Because of the sensitive nature of the SAs on SSF, regions of different DAP modes have been established
to reduce plume loading on the arrays. Regions I, II, and III (fig. 6) are defined by the Orbiter's jet
capabilities during its approach to SSF. The type breakout is defined by the first bum in the sequence. In
Region I, which is the area when the Orbiter DI is between 0 fi to 75 fi from the SSF DI, the Orbiter is in
Norm-Z, or No Low-Z, mode. A Norm-Z firing, which fires jets directly at SSF, is the most desirable
burn for a breakout because it accelerates the Orbiter directly away from SSF. Norm-Z mode is allowed in
Region I for the approach and required for a breakout so it is the first burn in a Region I breakout.
Therefore, a Region I breakout is identified as a Norm-Z breakout. The Norm-Z firings are too damaging
to SSF to be used outside of 75 fi ITI, so the Orbiter is in Low-Z mode in Regions II and III. Because of
the Orbiter's inability to fire the Norm-Z jets. an alternate breakout is required. The breakout for Regions
II and III starts with a radial down (-X RSBY, +Z LVLH) burn. This results in the Region II and Region
III breakouts being referred to as radial breakouts. Regions II and III have the same burn profiles but the
magnitudes of the burns are different. The radial breakout area was split into two regions to eliminate the
need to protect for the large +vbar intercept dispersions in Region II.
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Figure 6. Breakout Regions Defined by Distance Between Orbiter DI and SSF DI.
Database
The initial conditions (ICs) for this study are taken from a set of approaches flown in the Systems
Engineering Simulator. 3 The database consists of 97 docking-to-Assembly Complete. or PMC. runs and
58 berthing-to-SC4 runs. As stated above, the two configurations to be studied are PMC and SC5. The
docking-to-PMC trajectories are used for the breakouts from PMC and the berthing-to-SC4 trajectories are
used for the breakouts from SC5. The 58 berthing approaches to SC4 are used for docking approaches to
SC5 because both SC4 and SC5 are in a gravity gradient attitude hold mode. Therefore. the approach
procedures and trajectories are ve_' similar between the two configurations. The only bias is for the
difference in distance ITI between a docking approach and a berthing approach.
Specific points along the trajector3 _are cut out for use as ICs in the analysis. The points chosen for this
study are 0 ft ITI. 75 fi ITI. 200 fl ITI and vbar arrival. Since vbar arrival is difficult to obtain from a
large trajector).' data set. a method was developed to estimate its location. When the Orbiter reaches the
vbar. + 1 deg. the pilot modes the Orbiter from inertial attitude hold to AUTO mode. The database is
scanned for the next data entr3." after the Orbiter is moded to AUTO mode. Therefore. vbar arrival is
defined as the entry just after the Orbiter is moded to AUTO. or Post-AUTO
The parameters needed for ICs are the closing rate (fig. 7). the crosstrack relative position (fig. 8). and the
crosstrack relative velocit), (fig. 9). The crosstrack relative position and velocity are based on the
alignment of the Orbiter relative to SSF. The origin of the s3_stem displayed in the figures is defined as
the position of the Orbiter DI when the Orbiter Crew Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) is perfectly
aligned with the SSF COAS target and has no relative rates. The ICs are generated by starting the Orbiter
at this aligned position and then adding in dispersions in both position and rate.
_ Rateat 75 ft (dito di)for_fllAC_
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Figure 7. Data Example from Docking Approach to PMC.
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Figure 8. Example Data from Docking Approach to PMC.
_,rJ
[..
.E
t_
-0.35
ZI) vs YD Velocity at 75 ft (di to di)
SES 97 Case Docking to MBAC Database
-0.25
0.35 T
i
O.25
Vprotect = 0.257515 FF/S
_rotect(sse) = 0.30591 VI'/S
sse = Small Sample Error
0.25
i
-0.25
i
-0.35 _
0.35
YD in FITS
Figure 9. Example Data from Docking Approach to PMC.
Method for Analysis
The method for obtaining the results in this study follows the listed steps.
A. Breakout matrix development to cover all possible dispersion combinations for the boundaries of each
region for each configuration.
B. Generate the necessary statistical worst case ICs for each of the cases in the study. This requires the
relative Y and Z positions (X is set due to the specific ITI distance constraint for the boundaries of
each region) and the Y and Z relative velocities (the X relative velocity is the 3 sigma number
determined from the database).
C. These initial states are input into the Desktop Automated Real-Time Simulator (DARTS) processor.
and the man-in-the-loop simulation is run using the operational margin guidelines (to be defined
later) and the candidate burn profiles set up for this study. The burns are done in Pulse mode to get
clearly defined velocit) _ inputs. The process invoh'es inputting the necessary jet firings and then
allowing the processor to propagate the Orbiter through time. The propagation was continued for
three hours and forty five minutes to tr3._to obtain about two and a half revolutions of orbit travel.
This time is needed to obtain the desired results such as long-term clearance and separation phasing.
D. Relative motion plots are produced for both the X-Z and Y-Z planes for the breakout simulation for
each run.
E. Clearance analysis invoh,es using a set of overlays depicting the Orbiter, SC5. and PMC structures
(figs. 10-12). These overlays are created to the scale of the trajectoly plots created by DARTS. These
overlays also contain the deadbanding or motion range circles to protect for attitude or position errors.
Even though entire circles for complete rotation about the cg are shown, only realistic angular
rotations were used for clearance analysis.
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Figures 10-12. Overlay Figures (not to scale).
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These overlays are then placed along the trajectory, plot to determine the clearance available at
specific points along the plot. This is where the determination is made whether or not the 5-fl margin
of safety is preserved. If the final value is positive, then the firing input was sufficient to obtain the
necessary clearance under worst case conditions. This process is continued until a value of velocity
input is found that satisfies all the cases.
The analysis detailed above defines the minimum burn input needed to achieve a safe trajectory. The
minimum bum is developed from simulation using Pulse mode so that the input bum is very accurate.
If the minimum burn were performed in Accel mode, the burn would not be as accurate and the
potential exists for not achieving the needed input. Accel burns have been performed to be within +
0.2 fps of the target burn in flight and simulation. To protect for the Accel burn. the minimum burns
derived in Pulse mode, which are the Pulse mode target bums. must be increased to cover the possible
error in an Accel burn. To protect for possible "undershoot," the Pulse target is raised by the amount
of error seen, or 0.2 fps, to become the new Accel target burn. However, since this document is
intended to be used by the loads community for design cases, the maximum burn needs to be modeled.
Since the Accel target burn could be missed on the high side, a situation termed "overshoot," the
burns used by the loads community need to be the Accel target plus the possible overshoot error, or
0.2 fps. As a result, the minimum Pulse burn, defined the Pulse target burn. will be increased by 0.4
fps for use by the loads community to protect for either Accel or Pulse modes during a breakout.
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Worst Case Definition
With the distance between mating interfaces set to various specific distances ITI. worst case conditions
can be determined. The error, or margins, that are protected are broken into t_vo categories: Initial State
Error and Operational Margins.
Initial State Error
Statistical error has to be modeled into the initial Y-Z plane position and velocity data to provide
protection in both the relative position and velocib conditions. These errors are computed and
incorporated into the initial data put into the DARTS processor.
m. Due to the small sample size (97 and 58 samples), an error factor has to be included in the
dispersions for the initial state. This percentage of error is determined by both the sample size and
the confidence level desired for the value (fig. 13). This method is taken from Elementary Statistics
by Mario F. Triola. For the 97-case data set the error incurred will be 18.79% for a 99% level of
confidence while the 58-case data set has an error value of 24.35% for a 99% confidence level.
Percent Uncertaint_ in Std Dev vs Sample Size
For Std De'*' at 95 and 99 °o Confidence
7O
-_ 6O
dD
_j
CO
E
10
0 9O
__ 99°o. 188.1652"n**(-0.5036)
3()11 **( 1 'n)*n**(-0.4972)
2_4=35°o_ _ _-: __
10 20 30 40 50 50 70 80
50 rrq3 le S:ze
Figure 13. % Error vs. Sample Size.
B. The ideal situation during an approach is for the Orbiter's COAS reticle centerline to be perfectly
aligned with the COAS target on SSF and to have zero relative crosstrack rates. However. due to
piloting constraints, Orbiter performance, and control limitations, the Orbiter does not stay on the
centerline. As a result of these real world limitations, the approach trajectories vary around the
alignment point as the crosstrack relative velocities are altered due to DAP firing cross-coupling,
crew thruster inputs, and orbital mechanics. To generate initial conditions for this study, the
variabili b of the approach has to be considered and protected for since a generic breakout is desired.
The method shown below (fig. 14) defines one way to encompass the position error about the
centerline by calculating a circle about the centerline, the perfectly aligned trajectory, which
statistically bounds all of the variations in position derived from the database. This method is
conservative but it allows one to select positions an)_,here along the circle and still have at least
99.7% probability of protection for position errors.
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Y_ = +ItS z=s= R==4vL+zk
Rdisp = 3.44 * Rrm_ * 1-"
O = standard deviation
1-"= % increase due to small sample size
Ix : mean
0 2 = variance
Figure 14. Equations for Initial Condition Development Method.
This same method was applied to the crosstrack relative velocities to obtain a circle of protection, which
has a radius of Vdisp, about a null rate point. Once again, this method is conservative but it allows the
ea_' selection of initial conditions for analysis.
Operational Margins
These protections are implemented during the DARTS runs to deal with computer problems or human
error.
A. A 10-second waiting period for decision time is input at the first of the outer breakouts; i.e.. at 75 fl
ITI. This wait time was chosen in a discussion with the Guidance and Procedures Officers.
B, To verih/that the correct number of pulses are being recognized by the DARTS processor, the pulses
are input at approximately 1 pulse per second, which is much slower than will probably occur real
time.
C. The breakout is performed with a series of Pulse (Discrete) pulse inputs, not in Accei (Norm) mode,
due to the sensitive nature of the velocities needed and to make the input longer: this delays the
correction. Protection for Accel burns is added afterwards as described in the Method for Analysis
section.
Definitions for Analysis
The Rdisp and Vdisp values for dispersion computed earlier can be combined in various ways depending
upon which case is being protected for. A matrix of approximately 50 runs captured the various
combinations of ICs for both configurations at all three regions' boundaries. The distance along the vbar
is set for each case depending upon which boundary of which region is being analyzed. The X closing
rate is also set according to which boundary, of which region is to be studied. The cross-track positions
and velocities are varied, depending upon which area clearance is being checked for.
Rdisp=Ydisp=Zdisp
Vdisp = YDdisp = ZDdisp
The dispersed initial conditions are created by setting the Orbiter so that it is the proper X distance ITI
and the center of the Orbiter COAS is centered on the SSF COAS target. The crosstrack position is then
moved a distance in either the + Z direction, the + Y direction, or a combination of both. The relative
velocities are varied in the same manner.
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For this analysis, several areas along the protection circle are investigated. These areas divide into two
classes. The extreme regions represent the areas on the protection circle in which the dispersion is either
all + Z or all + Y. The second region is the combination area. This area is half, ray along the
circumference of the RMS circle between two extremes. The combination area allows the possibilit)' of
dispersion in two directions at once.
Extreme Cases
Y Align:
Y aligned means that the Y relative position is set so that the Orbiter COAS is at the same Y LVLH
coordinate as the SSF COAS target.
Z Align:
Z aligned means that the Z relative position is set so that the Orbiter COAS is at the same Z LVLH
coordinate as the SSF COAS target.
Z up:
Indicates the Orbiter moved up a distance Rdisp in Z (or in the direction of the -Z axis) from the (0.0)
point.
Z dn:
Indicates the Orbiter moved down a distance Rdisp in Z (or in the direction of the +Z axis) from the (0.0)
point.
Y rt:
Indicates the Orbiter moved a distance Rdisp in the direction of the -Y axis from the (0.0) point.
Y Ift:
Indicates the Orbiter moved a distance Rdisp in the direction of the +Y axis from the (0.0) point.
Combination Cases
YP:
Indicates the Y value needed to be on the position protection circle halfway between the Z extreme case
and the Y extreme case.
ZP"
Indicates the Z value needed to be on the position protection circle halfway between the Z extreme case
and the Y extreme case.
YDP:
Indicates the YD value needed to be on the velocit3._protection circle halfway between the ZD extreme case
and the YD extreme case.
ZDP:
Indicates the ZD value needed to be on the velocity protection circle halfway betxveen the ZD extreme case
and the YD extreme case.
*** Same Direction Convention As Above ***
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Both Regions
(0,0) Point:
Defined as the relative DI position of the Orbiter in the Y-Z LVLH plane where the SSF COAS target is
centered in the Orbiter COAS.
*** Same Direction Convention Used For Relative Velocities ***
TABLE V. INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR SC5 AND PMC AT 0 FT ITI.
SSFcg to SScg
SC5 Structure
At 0 ft DI to DI
X = 29.38 ft
XD = -0.1618 ft/s
Yalign = -12.33 ft
Zalign = 93.79 ft
Rdisp = 6.7924 fl
Vdisp = 0.1254 fl/s
YP= 4.8029 ft
YDP= 0.0887 ft/s
ZP = 4.8029 fl
ZDP= 0.0887 ft/s
SSFcg to SScg
PMC Structure
At 0 ft DI to DI
X = 48.54 fl
XD= -0.1015 ft/s
Yalign = -23.23 fl
Zalign = 44.99 fl
Rdisp = 0.9360 fl
Vdisp = 0.0642 ft/s
YP= 0.6619 fl
YDP= 0.0454 ft/s
ZP = 0.6619 ft
ZDP= 0.0454 ft/s
TABLE VI. INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR SC5 AND PMC AT 75 FT ITI.
SSFcg to SScg
SC5 Structure
At 75 ft D1 to DI
X = 104.38
XD = -0.3894
Yalign = -12.33
Zalign = 93.79
Rdisp = 46.4957
Vdisp = 0.3902
YP = 32.8774
YDP = 0.2759
ZP = 32.8774
ZDP = 0.2759
fl
ft/s
fl
fl
fl
ft/s
fi
ft/s
fi
ft/s
SSFcg to SScg
PMC Structure
At 75 ft DI to DI
X= 123.54 fl
XD= -0.3637 ft/s
Yalign = -23.23 fi
Zalign = 44.99 fl
Rdisp= 26.6925 fl
Vdisp = 0.3059 ft/s
YP= 18,8744 fl
YDP= 0.2163 fl/s
ZP= 18.8744 fl
ZDP= 0.2163 fl/s
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TABLEVII. INITIALCONDITIONSFORSC5ANDPMCAT200FTITI.
SSFcgto SScg
SC5 Structure
At 200 ft DI to DI
X = 229.38 fi
XD = -(I.6063 ft/s
Yalign = -12.33 ft
Zalign = 93.79 ft
Rdisp = 87.8870 ft
Vdisp = 0.7548 ills
YP= 62.1450 ft
YDP = (I.5338 ft/s
ZP = 62.1450 fl
ZDP = 0.5338 ft/s
SSFcg to SScg
PMC Structure
At 200 ft D! to DI
X = 248.54 fl
XD= -(I.5752 ft/s
Yalign = -23.23 ft
Zalign = 44.99 ft
Rdisp= 67.6491 fl
Vdisp = 0.6479 ft/s
YP= 47.835(I fi
YDP = (I.4581 ft/s
ZP = 47.835(I fi
ZDP = (1.4581 ft/s
TABLE VIII. INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR SC5 AND PMC AT POST-AUTO.
SSFcg to SScg
SC5 Structure
At Post-AUTO
X = 366.(18 fi
XD= -1.0500 ft/s
Yalign = -12.33 fi
Zalign = 93.79 fi
Rdisp = 170.14 fl
Vdisp = 1.3077 fffs
YP= 120.3(170 ft
YDP= (I.9247 ft/s
ZP = 120.307(I ft
ZDP = (1.9247 ft/s
SSFcg to SScg
PMC Structure
At Post-AUTO
X = 386.49 fl
XD= -1.1688 fi/s
Yalign = -23.23 fl
Zalign = 44.99 fi
Rdisp = 103.66 fi
Vdisp = 1.4144 ft/s
YP= 73.2997 fi
YDP = 1.0001 fi/s
ZP = 73.2997 fi
ZDP = 1.0001 ft/s
Results
The general plan for this study is to initially iterate on the first burn in the sequence to achieve two main
goals. The first goal is to provide adequate initial clearance between the Orbiter and SSF. The second
goal is either to have the first burn place the Orbiter on a long-term safe trajector). or to place the Orbiter
in a position so that subsequent burns can be performed without inducing plume loads on the SSF SAs.
As stated earlier, RCS burns outside of 1000 ft are assumed to be acceptable, so the initial burn should
either place the Orbiter on a long-term safe trajectory or position the Orbiter outside of 1000 fi so that
additional burns can be performed.
Region I
The Norm-Z burn in the Region I breakout was hoped to be enough to place the Orbiter on a safe long-
term trajectory. A single burn magnitude has been identified to provide acceptable initial clearance
between the Orbiter and the SSF structure for all of the various initial conditions that were analyzed. The
magnitude of this burn is (I.7 fps (+X LVLH) in Pulse mode. The clearance met the criteria placed upon it
by this analysis for each of the ICs generated for the distances of 0 ft ITI and 75 ft ITI. the boundaries of
Region I. The closest approach, which is produced by one of many initial conditions, is shown below (fig.
15) for three candidate burn magnitudes.
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Figure 15. Initial Burn Results for Region I Breakout.
The next part of the study determines whether the 0.7-fps (+X LVLH) burn would place the Orbiter on a
long-term safe trajectory that meets the constraints imposed earlier in this document. Figure 16 below
shows that 0.8 fps (+X LVLH) does not meet the criteria and 0.7 fps (+X LVLH) is entirely unacceptable.
F.....
4000
-2000
0.7 fps +X LVLH
2000
0.8 fps +X LVLH
Figure 16. Two Unsuccessful Single Burn Breakouts from Region I.
To obtain the necessary long-term clearance, two possible solutions are present. The first solution is to
increase the magnitude of the initial burn in Region I so the single burn will place the Orbiter into a safe
trajectory. The second alternative is to add two burns to the sequence. The first additional burn will move
the Orbiter outside of the 1000-ft radius envelope without pluming the SAs: the second additional burn
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will place the Orbiter on a safe trajectory. Due to the critical nature of the loading of the SAs. the second
method is chosen. Another concern thai was dealt with is the ICs' effect on the trajectory. Since a second
burn is needed to obtain long-term clearance, the temptation exists to plan a second (+X LVLH) burn
when the Orbiter is just above SSF (fig. 15). The problem with this is that the trajectories shown (fig. 15)
are for one initial condition, and a different initial condition could place the Orbiter directly in front of the
station if the second burn is set to occur on a timed response. This makes the breakout an initial condition
dependent sequence which is not the desired generic breakout. Once again, this leads to the second
method listed above where a radial burn (-Z LVLH) eliminates the dependence on the initial condition
and allows the breakout to become a generic timed event.
To implement the second method, additional constraints have to be considered. The initial burn will now
at least stop the Orbiter from closing and impart some opening rate. Also, initial clearance must be
obtained if for some reason the second burn is not executed or not performed correctly. This leads back to
the solution obtained earlier that the best initial burn is 0.7 fps (+X LVLH). Since radial down (+Z
LVLH) burns and out-of-plane (OOP) (±Y LVLH) burns are damaging to the SAs on most flights inside
of 75 ft ITI, a radial up (-Z LVLH) burn is selected for the second burn in the sequence. This burn will
raise the Orbiter at least 1000 fl above SSF: the Orbiter can then perform another (+X LVLH) burn to
safely phase away behind SSF. The radial up-firing results in the Orbiter's jets firing down where there is
no SSF structure. This burn is the least harmful of all the possible firings: therefore its magnitude should
be of no consequence to the loading on the SAs.
The final burn should also cause no harm to the SSF SAs owing to its distance from SSF and the fact that
the jets are generally firing away from SSF at ignition. The only final concern with this new method is
the possible clearance concerns with the Orbiter's tail when the Orbiter is very close to SSF. When the
Orbiter is near to dock. the tail of the Orbiter is underneath the SSF structure: thereforc the Orbiter must
open a distance before the second burn, radial up (-Z LVLH), is performed. Since the initial burn is set to
I).7 fps (+X LVLH), the time to wait between burn one and two needed to be determined. Several times
were tried and the time of two minutes was chosen. The third burn should be performed at approximately
the -rbar crossing, so a wait time of 15 minutes was chosen between burns two and three. Runs were
performed to define the second and third burns. The second burn is 1.8 fps (-Z LVLH) and is performed
two minutes after the completion of the 0.7 fps (+X LVLH) initial burn. Figure 17 below shows the
difference between the closest single burn 0.7-fps breakout and various breakouts using the new three-
burn sequence.
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Figure 17. Region I Breakout Initial Clearance with Complete Breakout Sequence.
The burn magnitude of burn three was chosen to be 1.8 fps (+X LVLH). Figure 18 below demonstrates
the closest approach breakouts using the three-burn breakout. The closest return for a Region I breakout
from SC5 is a -vbar intercept at about 36 000 ft while the closest -vbar intercept for breakouts from PMC
is about 39 000 ft. These two scenarios phase away from SSF at rates of 34 000 ft/rev and 40 000 ft/rev
for breakouts from SC5 and PMC. respectively.
20000
-200001 Lowest Phasing (.PMC)
_60000 -80000 - 100000
Closest -vbar Cross (SC5)
0.7 fps +X LVLH
Closest -vbar Cross (PMC) 2.0 min wait
1.8 fps -Z LVLH
' 15 min wait
200015 1.8 fps +X LVLH
Figure 18. Minimum Successful Breakouts from Region I for Each Configuration.
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Thedefinedsequenceof 0.7 fps (+X LVLH). 2-minute wait, 1.8 fps (-Z LVLH), 15-minute wait. and then
1.8 fps (+X LVLH) was then tested for all combinations of ICs at both boundaries of Region I. The results
of these runs are summarized in Tables IX and X.
TABLE IX. REGION I (0-75 FT DI TO TO) SC5 BREAKOUT MATRIX.
Stage Range Burns IC Closest -rbar
(DI-DI) (fl/s) Approach crossing
f_l tnt in?
SC5 0 0.7, 1.8. 1.8 Z up 40 800
ZD up
SC5 0 0.7. 1.8. 1.8 Z dn 37 800
ZD dn
SC5 75 0.7. 1.8. 1.8 Z &l 65 760
ZD dn
SC5 75 0.7. 1.8.1.8 Z up 55 800
ZD up
SC5 75 0.7. 1.8. 1.8 Z dn 65 700
ZD up
SC5 75 0.7, 1.8, 1.8 Z up 51 800
ZD dn
Range at Phasing
Burn 3 (fl/rev)
tnt t_,_-,'l
1580 41000
6.70
1250 40625
6.686
1250 34375
5.65
1250 38125
6.27
1090 34375
5.65
1300 37812
6,22
-vbar Prop
crossing Used
_fl,n mi / 9bs_
40000 143
6.58
41875 143
689
35938 142
5.91
39375 143
6.48
35938 143
5.91
39062 143
6.42
TABLE X. REGION I (0-75 FT DI TO DI) PMC BREAKOUT MATRIX.
Stage Range Burns IC Closest
(DI-DI) (fl/s) Approach
(fl_ (fit
PMC 75 0.7. 1.8. 1.8 Z up 35
ZD up
PMC 75 0.7. 1.8, 1.8 Z dn 60
ZD dn
J
PMC 75 0.7, 1.8, 1.8 Z dn 58
ZD up
PMC 75 0.7. 1.8. 1.8 Z up 58
ZDdn
PMC 75 0.7. 1.8. 1.8 Y lfl 50
YD lfl
PMC 75 0.7. 1.8. 1.8 ZPdn 60
ZDP dn
YP rt
YDP rt
PMC 75 0,7. 1,8. 1.8 Zpup 33
ZDPup
YPit
YDP r_
-rbar
crossing
875
875
830
900
830
875
850
Range at Phasing
Burn 3 (ft/rev)
_fl_ _nmi/rev t
1300 39063
6.43
1000 36875
6.07
1250 36875
6.07
1100 38750
6.38
1200 38125
6.27
1100 37500
6.17
1300 38750
6.38
-vbar Prop
crossing Used
_fl,n mi) (Ibs_
40938 143
6.74
38750 143
6.38
38438 143
6,33
40000 143
6.58
40000 143
6.58
38750 143
6.38
40313 143
6.63
The results show that this candidate burn sequence satisfies all constraints and criteria for the NTC
breakout from Region I. The Pulse mode NTC Region I breakout is 0.7 fps (+X LVLH), 2-minute wait.
1.8 fps (-Z LVLH), 15-minute wait. and then 1.8 fps (+X LVLH). Now the protection for Accel mode
must be added on. The above-defined burn magnitude must be met in order for the breakout to work, so
your Accel mode targets must be increased to at least the minimum acceptable burn plus the error of
undershoot, 0.2 fps. The new targets for Accel mode become 0.9 fps (+X LVLH), 2-minute wait. 2.0 fps
(-Z LVLH), 15-minute wait. and then 2.0 fps (+X LVLH). Since this is the new target, there still exists
the possibilil3 _of overshoot in Accel mode, another 0.2 fps, so the loads team performing analysis on the
SSF SAs should design to the maximum possible breakout that might occur. Therefore, the structural
design breakout for Region I is 1.1 fps (+X LVLH), 2-minute wait, 2.2 fps (-Z LVLH), 15-minute wait,
and then 2.2 fps (+X LVLH).
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Region II
As defined earlier, the first burn of the Region II breakout will be a radial down (+Z LVLH) firing. Due
to orbital mechanics, if a second burn is not performed then the Orbiter would come right back at SSF
after one revolution. This requires that a second burn be performed for a Region II breakout. The
constraints on the first burn will be to obtain adequate initial clearance between the Orbiter and SSF, and
to position the Orbiter to a point where the second burn can be performed without damaging the SAs on
SSF. The second burn needs to be a posigrade, or (+X LVLH), burn to raise the Orbiter above SSF and
phase away behind it. In this study, the second maneuver was performed one quarter revolution, or about
22.5 minutes, after the first burn. This second burn is outside of the 1000-ft radius envelope so the plume
impact should be minimized. An earlier study determined the initial burn magnitude to be 1.5 fps (+Z
LVLH). 4 This value was tested again and proved to be the minimum value to satish' the clearance
criteria. Figure 19 below shows the closest trajectoD" when performing a 1.5-fps (+Z LVLH) breakout in
Region II.
120 80 40
1.5 fps +Z LVLH
-40
4{
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120
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Figure 19. Minimum Successful Initial Clearance for Region II Breakout.
With the first burn set to 1.5 fps (+Z LVLH), the Orbiter will travel below the +vbar for the assigned time
of 22.5 minutes. The second burn will be performed to place the Orbiter in a safe trajectory, to phase
behind SSF. An iteration was performed on the magnitude of the second burn to tr).' to obtain the
minimum burn to satis_" the long-term clearance criteria established earlier. Magnitudes of 2.0 fps and
2.8 fps were attempted unsuccessfully (fig. 20).
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Figure 20. Examples of Unsuccessful Region II Breakouts.
The magnitude of the burn was increased until the conditions of the analysis were met with a magnitude
of 3.8 fps. Figure 21 belmv presents the worst case closest approach trajectories. The closest -vbar
intercept occurs on a breakout from SC5 at about 14 000 ft behind the SSF. The phasing from this
breakout is from about 18 000 ft/rev to about 40 000 ft/rev.
[ - PMC Phasing ---
-20000- ] I
Closest .-_ 1.9 fps +Z LVLll
22.5 mln wait
PMC 3.8 fps +X LVLH
2000(r r .... Closest
Figure 21. Minimum Successful Breakouts from Region II for Each Configuration.
Tables XI and XII present the summary" of the cases performed on DARTS for the Region II breakout.
Closest approach, phasing and -vbar intercept data are presented for each case. Some were unsuccessful
for burns below the final breakout design of 1.5 fps (+Z LVLH), 22.5-minute wait, and then a 3.8 fps (+X
LVLH) burn. The column titled "2nd Burn Range" presents the position of the Orbiter relative to SSF
when the second burn is performed. The "b" stands for "below" and the 'T' stands for "in front of." This
also shows that the second burn is well outside the 1000-ft envelope when it is performed.
21
TABLE XI. REGION II (75-200 FT DI TO DI) SC5 BREAKOUT MATRIX.
Stage Range Bums IC Closest -rbar 2nd Burn Phasing -vbar Prop
(DI-DI) (fvs) Approach crossing Range (fl) (ft/rev) crossing Used
t_) i_t /_/ (nmi._re,') (_..mi t (lbs)
SC5 75 1.5, 2.8 Z dn 70 8000 3000 b 23000 11000 129
ZD dn 6000 f 3.78 1.8
SC5 75 1.5.2.8 Z dn 68 6500 2800 b 22500 13000 129
ZD up 4800 f 3.7 2.13
SC5 75 1.9, 2.8 Z dn 68 9000 3500 b 23000 9000 145
ZD tin 7000 f 3.78 1.48
SC5 75 1.9, 3.8 Z dn 70 9750 3500 b 35000 22000 172
ZD dn 7000 f 5.76 3.62
SC5 75 1.5, 3,8 Z dn 70 9500 3200 b 36000 23000 156
ZD dn 6000 f 5.92 3.785
SC5 75 1.5, 3.8 Z dn 70 8000 2500 b 36000 26500 155
ZD up 4500 f 5.92 4.36
SC5 75 1.5, 3.8 Z up 30 8000 2000 b 39000 32000 155
ZD up 4000 f 6_42 5.27
SC5 75 1.5.3.8 Z up 54 9000 2700 b 39000 29000 156
ZD dn 5000 f 6.42 4.77
SC5 200 1.9, 2.8 Z dn 180 8000 5000 b 18000 300 145
ZD dn 7000 f 2.96 .049
SC5 200 1.9, 3.8 Z dn 180 10500 4500 b 30000 14000 172
ZD dn 8400 f 4.94 2.30
SC5 200 1.9,3.8 zda 180 10000 3200b 41000 28000 172
ZD &l 7000 f 6.75 4.61
XD-0
SC5 200 1.5, 3.8 Z dn 180 10000 4000 b 32000 15000 156
ZD tin 8000 f 5.27 2.47
SC5 200 1.5, 3.8 Z tin 180 8000 3000 b 31000 19000 155
ZD up 4200 f 5.10 3.13
SC5 200 1.5, 3.8 Z up 100 7500 2000 b 37000 30000 155
ZD up 3500 f 6.09 4.84
SC5 200 1.5.3.8 Z up 160 10000 3500 b 36000 24000 156
ZD dn 6000 f 5.92 3.95
TABLE XII. REGION II (75-200 FT DI TO DI) PMC BREAKOUT MATRIX.
Stage Range Burns IC Closes! -rbar
(DI-DI) (fl/s) Approach crossing
PMC 200 1.9, 3.8 Z dn 180 10000
ZDdn
PMC 200 1.5, 3.8 Z dn 190 9500
ZD dn
PMC 200 1.5.3.8 Z dn 160 8000
ZD up
PMC 200 1.5.3,8 Z up 90 7000
ZD up
PMC 200 1.5, 3.8 Z up 140 9500
ZDdn
2nd Burn
Range (ft)
3500 b
7000 f
Phasing
(lUrer)
(nmi/re,)
34000
5.59
-vbar
crossing
19000
3.13
3500 b 34000 21000
6000 f 5.59 3.46
2500 b 34000 25000
4000 f 5.59 4.11
1800 b 39000 32000
2500 f 6.42 5.27
3000 b 39000 28000
5000 f 6.42 4.61
Prop
Used
Obs)
156
143
143
143
143
The Pulse mode results for the Region II breakout are 1.5 fps (+Z LVLH) followed by a 22.5-minute pause
and then a 3.8 fps (+X LVLH) burn. To protect for Accel mode. once again the magnitude will have to be
increased by 0.2 fps for the new target values and then by another 0.2 fps for the structural loading design
cases. This leaves 1.7 fps (+Z LVLH) followed by a 22.5-minute pause and then a 4.0-fps (+X LVLH)
burn for the target burns, and 1.9 fps (+Z LVLH) followed by a 22.5-minute pause and then a 4.2-fps (+X
LVLH) burn for the structural design breakout from Region II.
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Region III
The breakout from Region III will be the same as for Region II except that the burns will be of larger
magnitude, owing to the larger dispersions in the ICs near vbar intercept. The initial radial down firing
was increased until the closest case met the clearance criteria for the analysis, Figure 22 below displays
this 2.0-fps (+Z LVLH) magnitude, in the closest approach trajector). _.
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Figure 22. Minimum Successful Initial Clearance for Breakout in Region III.
Since the radial component of the breakout increases and the ICs are larger, the second burn will have to
increase in order to still maintain a safe trajectory. The value was increased by I fps to 4.8 fps and the
limiting case showed an unsuccessful result by not providing at least a 2-nmi buffer behind SSF (fig, 23).
I
40000
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......oooo
Figure 23. Example of Unsuccessful Breakout from Region III.
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Themagnitudeof the second burn was increased again to a value of 5.3 fps. This value satisfied the
clearance constraints on the problem. The worst case closest trajectories (fig. 24) show that the nearest
-vbar intercept is at about 13 000 ft. The phasing setup by the breakout is about 50 000 ft/rev.
I PMC Phasing t
l°sest-1 2.4 fps -Z LVLH
_-- PMC _ 22.5 min wait
2000 Closest 5.3 fps -X LVLH
Figure 24. Minimum Successful Region III Breakout for Each Configuration.
A summary of the cases tested for Region III is presented in Tables XIII and XIV. The SC5 cases were
performed mostly with a second burn of 4.8 fps until the limiting case was identified. However. since a
larger second burn only helps the clearance, all cases that clear for a 4.8-fps burn will easily clear with a
5.3-fps burn. Once again, the second burn in each case is performed well outside of the 1000-ft envelope.
TABLE XIII. REGION III (200 POST-AUTO FT DI TO D1) SC5 BREAKOUT MATRIX.
Stage Range Bums IC Closest -rbar 2nd Bum Phasing -vbar Prop
(DI-DI) (fl/s) Approach crossing Range (fl) (ft/rev) crossing Used
/fit fill tfl) (nmi/rev) (ft, nmi t tlbs/
SC5 200 2.0, 4.8 Z dn 190 12000 4500 b 44000 25000 199
ZD dn 9000 f 7.24 4.11
SC5 200 2.4, 5.3 Z tin 190 14000 5000 b 52000 31000 226
ZD (In 9000 f 8.56 5.1
SC5 200 2.0, 4.8 Z dn 180 11000 3250 b 43000 31000 198
ZD up 6000 f 7.08 5.1
SC5 200 2.0, 4.8 Z up 100 9500 2500 b 52000 40000 199
ZD up 4250 f 8.56 6.58
SC5 200 2.0, 4.8 Z up 130 13000 3750 b 50000 34000 199
ZD dn 7000 f 8.23 5.59
SC5 Post 2.0, 3.8 Z dn 400 9000 5000 b 20000 4000 172
Auto ZD up 6000 f 3.29 0.66
SC5 Post 2.4, 4.8 Z dn 400 14000 7000 b 34000 7000 214
Anto ZD dn 10000 f 5.59 1.15
SC5 Post 2.4, 5.3 Z &_ 400 14000 7000 b 40000 13000 225
,Auto ZD dn 10000 f 6.58 2.14
SC5 Post 2.0, 4.8 zdn 400 13000 4000 b 50000 33000 198
Auto ZD dn 9000 f 8.23 5.43
XD=0
SC5 Post 2.0, 4.8 Z dn 400 13000 6000 b 33000 8000 199
Auto ZD dn 10000 f 5.43 1.32
SC5 Post 2.0, 4.8 Z dn 300 10000 4500 b 33000 17000 199
Auto ZD up 7000 f 5.43 2.79
SC5 Post 2.0, 4.8 Z up 90 9000 3000 b 45000 36000 199
Auto ZD up 4500 f 7.40 5.92
SC5 Post 2.0. 4.8 zup 280 7500 500 b 64000 60000 199
Auto ZD up 1200 f 10.53 9.87
XD=0
SC5 Post 2.0. 4.8 Z up 220 12000 5000 b 46000 27000 198
Auto ZD dn 9000 f 7.57 4.44
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TABLEXlV. REGIONIII (2(10POST-AUTOFTDITODI)PMCBREAKOUTMATRIX.
Stage Range Burns IC Closest -rbar 2nd Burn Phasing -vbar Prop
(DI-DI) (fl/s) Approach crossing Range (fl) (ft/rev) crossing Used
(fl_ _fl_ _ft_ _nmi/rev_ _fl, nmi_ _lbs_
PMC 200 2.4. 5.3 Z dn 180 12000 4000 b 54000 37000 207
ZD dn 8000 f 8.88 6.09
PMC 200 2.0. 5.3 Z dn 180 12000 4000 b 54000 37000 197
ZD dn 7000 f 8.88 6.09
PMC 200 2.0. 5.3 Z dn 110 10000 3000 b 53000 42000 197
ZD up 5000 f 8.72 6.91
PMC 200 2.0. 5.3 Z up 100 9500 2000 b 59000 50000 197
ZD up 3750 f 9.71 8.23
PMC 200 2.0. 5.3 Z up 100 11000 3500 b 58000 45000 197
ZD dn 6000 f 9.54 7.40
PMC Post 2.4. 5.3 Z dn 260 15000 6000 b 43000 17000 207
,.kttto ZD dn 10000 f 7.08 2.79
PMC Post 2.0. 5.3 Z dn 260 14000 6000 b 43000 17000 197
Auto ZD dn 10000 f 7.08 2,79
PMC Post 2,0. 5.3 Z dn 140 10000 3500 b 43000 27000 197
Auto ZD up 5000 f 7.08 4.44
PMC Post 2.0. 5.3 Z up 18 9000 3000 b 50000 40000 197
Auto ZD up 4000 f 8.23 6.58
PMC Post 2.0. 5.3 Z up 200 13000 5000 b 50000 30000 197
Auto ZD dn 9000 f 8.23 4.94
The final design burn for Region III is 2.0 fps (+Z LVLH), a 22.5-minute pause, then a 5.3-fps (+X
LVLH) burn in Pulse mode. To protect for Accel mode, again the magnitude will have to be increased by
(I.2 fps for the new target values and then by another 0.2 fps for the structural loading design cases. This
leaves 2.2 fps (+Z LVLH) followed by a 22.5-minute pause, and then a 5.5-fps (+X LVLH) burn for the
target burns and 2.4 fps (+Z LVLH) followed by a 22.5-minute pause, and then a 5.7-fps (+X LVLH) burn
for the structural design breakout from Region III.
Conclusions
NTC Breakout
Complete generic breakout sequences have been defined for all approaches to SSF. This analysis
specifically outlines the magnitudes and procedures for a breakout in any of the described regions during a
tail-down +vbar approach to SSF (fig. 25). The values presented in figure 25 are the target burns for an
Accel breakout during an approach. The + 0.2 fps accounts for error in the execution of the burns wherc
the lower limit is the minimum burn required to achieve a safe trajectory. The minimum burn could be
achieved to more accuracy using Pulse mode to input the burns but this requires a longer amount of time.
The upper limit on the burns represents the maximum burn expected during a breakout. This magnitude
is the value that should be protected during loads analysis on the SSF SAs.
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Figure 25. Procedural Flowchart for NTC Breakout.
TC Breakout
Although not explicitly covered in this analysis, the TC breakout is just an alteration of the data provided.
The TC breakout is a breakout that ends in an emergency deorbit within 30 minutes of calling for the
breakout.
Region I:
The TC breakout in Region I uses the same burns for burns one and two as the NTC breakout. The only
difference between the two breakouts is the third burn. In the TC breakout, the third burn becomes the
deorbit OMS burn. The Orbiter will be above and behind SSF so there is no risk of colliding with SSF.
However, since the deorbit burn is an extremely large retrograde burn, the damage on the SSF SAs could
be devastating. Due to time constraints on the breakout, there is no way to avoid being behind SSF and
firing essentially right at the back of SSF once the deorbit burn begins.
Regions H and IIl:
The TC breakout in Regions II and III uses the same first burn as the NTC burn but then the procedure
changes. Approximately 4-7 minutes after the first burn, a second burn, which is a 4-5-fps OOP (± Y
LVLH) burn, needs to be executed. This OOP burn needs to go in the direction in which the Orbiter is
heading OOP due to its IC. At 10-12 minutes after the second burn, the deorbit burn can begin. The
Orbiter will be in front of SSF but it will be OOP enough so that the Orbiter will pass beside SSF as soon
as the deorbit burn begins. There is a window on the deorbit burn that needs to be defined. If the window
is violated, the Orbiter will begin to move back towards SSF and the deorbit burn potentially will lead to a
collision. The second burn, the OOP burn, might cause damage to the SSF SAs due to its large magnitude
and close proximity, to SSF. This burn is required, however, to set up a safe passage for the deorbit. The
deorbit burn, once again, holds considerable potential to damage the SSF structure.
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AnadditionalissuethatcameoutoftheTCbreakoutisthatanOOPcomponentoften is entered into the
deorbit burn to burn off fuel so that the Orbiter is within limits for entD'. The unknoxvn value of this OOP
component makes it extremely difficult to define the OOP limits on burn two. so an agreement was
reached with the TrajectoD' Operation Branch/DM4 that the OOP component of the deorbit burn would be
placed such that the Orbiter will move away from SSF rather that towards it if an occasion arose. 2
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TA/Manager, Space Shuttle Integration and Operations Office
DA2/Assistant Director for Space Shuttle Program
Acceptable Clezrance Criteria for Payloads Ejected from the
Orbiter Cargo Bay
Summary
Clearance criteria for payloads ejected from the orbiter cargo bay are a
function of ejection direction and maturity of the ejection system.
Previously flown systems will be less constrained than new systems and those
with ejection delta-V components toward the orbiter cabin must guarantee
adequate cabin clearance for worst case conditions. Clearance criteria for
new ejection systems will be assessed on a system-unique basis.
Discussion
To effectively use analysis resources and ensure timely completion of flight
planning activities, a comprehensive set of analysis criteria is mandatory.
The following is a set of criteria recommended by MOD. Several distinctions
will be made concerning ejection systems and the corresponding clearance
criteria. These distinctions are maturity of the system (previously flown
on the orbiter in its configuration) and direction of the ejection velocity
components. Also, these clearance criteria must be met in a defined "worst
case" scenario.
Operation of the orbiter and the payload ejection system can potentially
encounter system failures on both sides which would decrease the expected
clearance between the orbiter and ejected payload. Additionally,
performance of component parts and dispersions in other factors can further
reduce the planned clearance. Finally, the ejection system must perform
such that an orbiter maneuver Is not required to ensure satisfactory
clearance for the close-in separation concerns. The method for combining
these clearance reduction parameters is as follows:
a. Add the two worst case clearance reduction failures in the worst
direction
b. Root sum square (RSS) the clearance reduction dispersions
c. Determine the worst case thermal bowing effects on available
clearance
Failure + Failure + RSS + Thermal Bowing = clearance reduction
A-!
2With the method of determining clearance reduction defined, application to
the ejection systems is in order.
Mature systems with an ejection delta-V component toward the orbiter cabin
must ensure that the payload and/or attached hardware clear the orbiter
cabin/nose by at least 5 ft in nominal and contingency operations after
applying the worst case clearance reduction previously discussed. Also, the
system must ensure a positive clearance with all other orbiter structure,
ASE, and other structure attached to the orbiter. The 5-ft cabin clearance
_s included as a confidence factor For the orbiter crew that the ejected
vehicle does indeed have sufficient clearance with the orbiter; thereby
precluding the crew From initiating an orbiter avoidance maneuver. Likewise,
mature ejection systems without an ejection delta-V component toward the
cabin must ensure positive clearance between the ejected vehicle and all
other hardware or orbiter structure.
Ejection systems being Flown for the First time must satisfy additional
clearance constraints due to the lack of maturity in their system under
flight conditions. In this case, the clearance criteria will be the same as
a mature system plus an additional clearance margin assessed on a sxstem
un_.__i_i_i_i_i_i_uebasis. Id ally, the assessment could be made early in the system
design to preclude Flight design and system design impacts during later
critlcal times.
Conclusions and Recommendation
Clearance criteria for payload ejection systems are a Function of the system
maturity, performance factors, and Failure scenarios. The system must meet
specified clearance reduction criteria and ensure the minimum required
clearance. First time ejection systems may be assessed an additional
clearance margin determined on a system unique basis.
MOD recommends the Shuttle Program OFfice adopt the Boeing clearance criteria
currently in place for the configured IUS/payload ejection system.
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DM22/G. W. Ricks
DM23/C. C. Anderson
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To: DM23/M.Donahoo
From: DM42/Head, Orbit Flight Dynamics Section
Subject: Emergency Deorbit durina V-bar Aooroachesto SSF
The question has come up as to whether or not the flight dynamics officer (FDO)
would compute an emergency deorbit maneuver solution with out-of-plane
wasting if a major Orbiter anomaly occurred while completing a final approach to
a target vehicle. Clearly the likelihood of such an event is extremely remote, but
protecting for this case has driven the design of our current standard emergency
deorbit breakout plan. The current plan has the crew performing a < = 1.0 fps
opening rate from the target, followed by a 4 fps out-of-plane (OOP) maneuver 4
minutes later, and then eithera 3 fps posigrade maneuver (5 minutes later) or a
perigee adjust/deorbit maneuver ASAP. The 4 fps OOP maneuver was designed to
protect for a worst case scenario where the FDO would compute a fuel wasting
deorbit burn that was 45 degrees out of plane. The timing of that burn (and the
full 3 burn sequence) is tied strongly to the 45 degree angle protection. Things get
worse for the SSF approach wherea simple 1 fpsopening rate is not plausible due
to plume impingement on the solar panels. In this case, the first burn of the prox
ops breakout is a downward 1-2 fps manuver. A new emergency deorbit sequence
is under development to ensure that the SSF design is robust.
We have discussed this situation internally, and concluded that the FDO may not
have time to compute the OOP fuel wasting deorbit maneuver during this
emergency. She/he will compute the inplane optimum deorbit maneuver to an
ELS. If time remains, a fuel wasting maneuver can be computed which we can
assure will be in the same direction as the4 fpsOOP maneuver. The MOCdeorbit
maneuver processor (DMP) now chooses the OOP direction to minimize cross-
range, but the FDO can quickly evaluate the PEG7targets on the Deorbit Digitals
display and evaluate the direction, and modify if necessary. The bottom line is"
the SSF breakout maneuver can be designed without protecting for the 45 degree
OOPwasting component. This will allow the design to be much simpler and less
constrained to meet a specific timeline.
Don J. Pearson
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